Job Polarization and Structural Change by Barany, Zsofia & Siegel, Christian
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2018, 10(1): 57–89 
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150258
57
Job Polarization and Structural Change†
By ZsÓfia L. Bárány and Christian Siegel*
We document that job polarization—contrary to the consensus—
has started as early as the 1950s in the United States: middle-wage 
workers have been losing both in terms of employment and aver-
age wage growth compared to low- and high-wage workers. Given 
that polarization is a long-run phenomenon and closely linked to the 
shift from manufacturing to services, we propose a structural change 
driven explanation, where we explicitly model the sectoral choice of 
workers. Our simple model does remarkably well not only in match-
ing the evolution of sectoral employment, but also of relative wages 
over the past 50 years. (JEL E24, J21, J22, J24, J31)
The polarization of the labor market is a widely documented phenomenon in the United States and several European countries since the 1980s.1 This phenome-
non, besides the relative growth of wages and employment of high-wage occupations, 
also entails the relative growth of wages and employment of low-wage occupations 
compared to middle-wage occupations. The leading explanation for polarization is 
the routinization hypothesis, which relies on the assumption that information and 
computer technologies (ICT) substitute for middle-skill and, hence, middle-wage 
(routine) occupations, whereas they complement the high-skilled and high-wage 
(abstract) occupations (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
2006; Autor and Dorn 2013; Feng and Graetz 2015; Goos, Manning, and Salomons 
2014; Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014).
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we document a set of facts that 
raises flags that routinization driven by ICT, although certainly playing a role from 
the 1980s onward, might not be the only driving force behind this phenomenon. 
1 See, for example, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Autor and Dorn (2013) for the United States; Goos and 
Manning (2007) for the United Kingdom; Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009) for 
Germany; Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009, 2014) for Europe. 
* Bárány: Department of Economics, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, France (email: zsofia.
barany@sciencespo.fr); Siegel: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP, UK 
(email: c.siegel@kent.ac.uk). We wish to thank Árpád Ábrahám, Moshe Buchinsky, Francesco Caselli, Nicolas 
Coeurdacier, David Dorn, Georg Duernecker, Georg Graetz, Emeric Henry, Per Krusell, L. Rachel Ngai, Rish 
Singhania, Silvana Tenreyro, and Ákos Valentinyi as well as seminar and conference participants at Trinity College 
Dublin, UC Berkeley, Sciences Po, Stockholm School of Economics, Exeter, the Vienna Joint Macro Seminar, 
the 7th Nordic Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics, the European Meeting of the Econometric Society in 
Gothenburg, the 16th IZA/CEPR European Summer Symposium in Labour Economics, the 2013 Cologne 
Workshop on Macroeconomics, the 2013 Winter Meeting of the Hungarian Society of Economists, the Christmas 
Meetings of the German Economists Abroad in Konstanz, the German Economic Association Annual Meeting 2014, 
the 23rd CEPR European Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics, University College London, the 
NBER Summer Institute 2016 Macro Perspectives group for useful comments.
† Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150258 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
58 AMEricAn EcOnOMic JOUrnAL: MAcrOEcOnOMicS JAnUAry 2018
Second, based on these facts, we propose a novel perspective on the polarization of 
the labor market, one based on structural change.
Our analysis of US data for the period 1950–2007 reveals some novel facts.2 First, 
we document that polarization defined over occupational categories both in terms of 
employment and wages has been present in the United States since the 1950s, which 
is long before ICT could have played a role. Second, we show that at least since the 
1960s the same patterns for both employment and wages are discernible in terms 
of three broad sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing, and high-skilled ser-
vices. Moreover, we confirm previous findings that a significant part of the observed 
occupational employment share changes are driven by sectoral employment shifts. 
Additionally, we show that sectoral effects contribute significantly to occupational 
wage changes. Therefore understanding the sectoral labor market trends is import-
ant even for the occupational trends.
Based on these facts, we propose a structural change driven explanation for these 
sectoral labor market trends. We introduce a Roy-type selection mechanism (Roy 
1951) into a multi-sector growth model, where each sector values a specific skill. 
Individuals, who are heterogeneous along a range of skills, optimally select which 
sector to work in. As long as the goods produced by the different sectors are com-
plements, a change in relative productivities increases labor demand in the relatively 
slow growing sectors, and wages in these sectors have to increase in order to attract 
more workers.
In particular, we assume that there are three types of consumption goods: low-end 
service, manufacturing, and high-end service goods.3 We break services into two 
as they are comprised of many different subsets, e.g., dry cleaners versus banking, 
which seem hardly to be perfect substitutes in consumption, as would be implied by 
having a single-service consumption in households’ preferences. In our model, we 
therefore treat low- and high-end services as being just as substitutable with each 
other as they are with manufacturing goods.
A change in relative productivities does not only affect relative supply, but 
through prices it also affects relative demand. Given that goods and the two types of 
services are compliments, as relative labor productivity in manufacturing increases, 
labor has to reallocate from manufacturing to both service sectors. To attract more 
workers into both low- and high-skilled services, their wages have to improve rel-
ative to manufacturing. Since in the data we see that manufacturing jobs tend to be 
in the middle of the wage distribution, this mechanism leads to a pattern of polar-
ization in terms of sectors, which is driven by the interaction of supply and demand 
for sectoral output.
We calibrate the model to quantitatively assess the contribution of structural 
change—driven by unbalanced technological progress—to the polarization of 
wages and employment. Taking measured labor productivity growth from the data 
2 Analyzing the data until more recent years does not affect our findings; we chose 2007 as the final year to 
exclude the potential impact of the financial crisis. 
3 Buera and Kaboski (2012) also split services into low- and high-skilled: their selection is based on the fraction 
of college-educated workers in the industry. Their main interest is linking the rising skill premium to the increasing 
share of services in value added, and they emphasize the home versus market production margin. Our focus is very 
different: sectoral wages. 
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and using existing estimates for the elasticity of substitution between sectors, we 
find that our model predicts between 33 and 59 percent of the relative average wage 
gain of high- and low-skilled services compared to manufacturing, and between 62 
and 99 percent of the change in employment shares. For this exercise, we quantify 
the adjustment of labor productivity growth needed to correct for selection effects in 
the calibrated model. Without these adjustments, productivity growth is understated 
in the expanding sectors, and is overstated in the shrinking sector; according to our 
model this would lead to an overstatement of annual productivity growth rate differ-
entials by between 27 and 35 percent.
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature both on polarization and on 
structural change. To our knowledge, these two phenomena until now have been 
studied separately.4 However, according to our analysis of the data, polarization 
of the labor market and structural change are closely linked to each other, and 
according to our model, industrial shifts can lead to polarization.5 Our theory high-
lights a particular connection between structural change and occupational structure. 
Structural change leads to the sector with the highest productivity growth to shrink 
in terms of employment, and to experience lower wage growth than the other sectors 
of the economy; the occupation that is used the most intensively in this sector also 
experiences employment and wage losses. In the period 1950 to 2007 around half 
of routine employment was in the manufacturing sector (and around 80 percent of 
manufacturing hours were in routine jobs). Thus, when manufacturing started to 
shrink after 1950, this led to a “hollowing out” pattern, as routine workers were in 
the middle both in terms of skills and wages.
The structural change literature has documented for several countries that as 
income increases employment shifts away from agriculture and from manufac-
turing toward services, and expenditure shares follow similar patterns (Kuznets 
1957; Maddison 1980; Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2014). In particular, 
the employment and expenditure share of manufacturing has been declining since 
the 1950–1960s in the United States, while those in services have been increasing. 
From an empirical perspective, we add to this literature by documenting that in the 
United States the employment patterns are mimicked by the path of relative average 
wages. The economic mechanisms put forward in the literature for structural trans-
formation combine specific features of preferences with some form of technologi-
cal progress. Some papers assume non-homothetic preferences, such that changes 
in aggregate income—coming from technological progress—lead to a reallocation 
of employment across sectors (Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 2001; Boppart 2014). 
Other papers focus on differential total factor productivity (TFP) growth across sec-
tors (Ngai and Pissarides 2007) or on changes in the supply of an input used by 
different sectors with different intensities (Caselli and Coleman 2001, Acemoglu 
and Guerrieri 2008).
4 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) look at the contribution of 
 between-industry shifts to the polarization of occupational employment, but do not analyze the effect of structural 
change on the polarization of the labor market. 
5 While we focus in the main text on the link between industrial and occupational structure since 1950 –1960, we 
show in online Appendix A.10, using data over 1850–1940, that there is also a close connection over much longer 
time series, see Figure A-7 and Table A-9. 
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We build on the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) closely, with one important 
modification: we explicitly model sectoral labor supply. As our goal is to study the 
joint evolution of employment and wages, we introduce heterogeneity in workers’ 
skills, who endogenously sort into different sectors. In order to meet increasing 
labor demands in certain sectors—driven by structural change—the relative wages 
of those sectors have to increase. Since we model the sector of work choice, we can 
analyze the effects of structural change on relative sectoral wages, which is not com-
mon in models of structural change.6 Another modification of Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007) is that we do not model capital, as our interest is in the heterogeneity of 
labor supply. The change in relative sectoral labor productivity can be driven by 
differential sectoral TFP changes or by capital accumulation and different sectoral 
capital intensities.7 We stay agnostic about the origin of the differential labor pro-
ductivity growth across sectors. As Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) point out, 
it is possible that part of this since the 1980s or 1990s is driven by different routine 
intensities and ICT. While the spread of ICT is not likely to be driving the differen-
tial sectoral productivity growth pre-1980, other forms of mechanization could have 
had a stronger impact in the manufacturing sector than in services over the longer 
time horizon that we study.
Ours is not the first paper to consider sectoral choice in a model of structural 
change. The setup of Matsuyama (1991) is similar, where agents have different effi-
ciencies across sectors, but focuses on the theoretical possibility of multiplicity of 
stationary steady states. Caselli and Coleman (2001) study the role of falling costs of 
education in the structural shift from agriculture to manufacturing, and they derive 
predictions about the relative wages in the farm and non-farm sector. Focusing on 
cross-country differences, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) show that self-selection can 
account for gaps in productivity and wages between agriculture and non-agriculture. 
Buera and Kaboski (2012) analyze the relation between the increasing value added 
share of the service sector and the increasing skill premium, without exploring their 
model’s implications for sectoral employment or wages, whereas this is the focus 
of our paper.
The polarization literature typically focuses on employment and wage patterns 
after the 1980s or 1990s. We contribute to this literature by documenting that in the 
United States the polarization of occupations in terms of wages and employment has 
started as early as the 1950s. As mentioned before, the leading explanation is rou-
tinization linked to ICT. While the spread of ICT is a convincing explanation for the 
polarization of labor markets after the mid-1980s, it does not provide an explanation 
for the patterns observed earlier.8 But it is conceivable that similar factors, not linked 
to ICT, but to other forms of mechanization, might have contributed to polarization 
earlier. Another explanation suggested in the literature is consumption spillovers. 
6 A notable exception is Caselli and Coleman (2001). 
7 For example, if ICT is used more intensively in the manufacturing sector, and ICT becomes cheaper, then this 
would show up as an increase in the relative productivity of manufacturing workers. 
8 Another explanation is the increasing off-shorability of tasks (rather than finished goods), as first emphasized 
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). It has been argued that it is largely the middle-earning jobs that are 
 off-shorable, but the evidence is mixed (Blinder 2009, Blinder and Krueger 2013, Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Just 
as for the ICT routinization hypothesis, this mechanism could have explanatory power from the 1980s onward. 
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This argument suggests that as the income of high-earners increases, their demand 
for low-skilled service jobs increases as well, leading to a spillover to the lower end 
of the wage distribution (Manning 2004, Mazzolari and Ragusa 2013). We do not 
incorporate such a mechanism in our model, as we strive for the most parsimonious 
setup featuring structural change, which does a good job in replicating the basic 
sectoral labor market facts since the 1960s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I lays out our empir-
ical findings, Section II our theoretical model, Section III the quantitative results, 
and Section IV concludes.
I. Polarization in the Data
Using US census data between 1950 and 2000 and the 2007 American Community 
Survey (ACS), we document the following three facts: (i) polarization in terms 
of occupations—contrary to the consensus—started as early as the 1950–1960s, 
(ii) wages and employment have been polarizing in terms of broadly defined indus-
tries as well, (iii) a significant part of employment and wage polarization in terms of 
occupations is driven by industry-level changes. The focus of our quantitative model 
is fact (ii). We document fact (i) as most of the literature documents polarization 
in terms of occupations. The employment part of fact (iii) has been documented in 
the literature using shift-share decompositions (Acemoglu and Autor 2011, Goos, 
Manning, and Salomons 2014), here we confirm it for our classification, data, and 
time horizon. We also conduct a similar decomposition for wages and show that a 
significant part of relative occupational wage changes are driven by industry effects. 
We report fact (iii) to convince the reader whose main interest is in occupations, 
that for the full picture one needs to consider industries as well. In what follows we 
document each of these facts in detail.
A. Polarization in Terms of Occupations
In the empirical literature, polarization is mostly represented in terms of occu-
pations. We document polarization in terms of two occupational classifications. We 
start from the finest balanced occupational codes possible, and then go to ten broad 
occupational categories.
Following the methodology used in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006); Acemoglu 
and Autor (2011): and Autor and Dorn (2013), we plot the smoothed changes in log 
real wages and employment shares for occupational percentiles, where occupations 
are ranked according to their 1980 mean hourly wages.9 The novelty in these graphs 
is that we show these patterns going back until 1950, rather than focusing only on 
the post-1980 period.10 In both graphs, each of the four curves represent changes 
that occurred over a different 30-year period. The top panel in Figure 1 shows that 
9 We split occupations into 100 groups, each representing 1 percent of employment in 1980. We smooth 
changes in log real hourly wages and employment shares with a locally weighted regression using a bandwidth of 
0.8. 
10 For comparability with the literature, we rank occupations based on their mean hourly wage in 1980. However, 
given that we look at a longer horizon than most of the literature, we also plot these changes against a different 
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there has been polarization in terms of real wages in all 30-year periods, since the 
real wage change is larger for low- and for high-ranked occupations than it is for 
middle-ranked occupations. The polarization of real wages is most pronounced in 
the first two 30-year intervals, but it is clearly discernible in the following ones as 
well from the slight U-shape of the smoothed changes. The bottom panel shows 
the smoothed employment share changes. The picture shows that employment did 
ranking of occupations, one based on the 1950 mean hourly real wages. The patterns look the same, see Figure A-1 
and the discussion in online Appendix A. 
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Figure 1. Smoothed Changes in Wages and Employment
notes: The data is taken from IPUMS US census data (provided by Ruggles et al. 2010) for 1950, 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000, and the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2007. The sample excludes agricultural occu-
pations/industries and observations with missing wage data; the details are given in online Appendix A. Balanced 
occupation categories (183 of them) were defined by the authors based on Meyer and Osborne (2005), Dorn (2009), 
and Autor and Dorn (2013). The horizontal axis contains occupational skill percentiles based on their 1980 mean 
wages (see online Appendix for details). In panel A, the vertical axis shows for each occupational skill percentile 
the 30-year change in log hourly real wages, whereas, in panel B, it shows the 30-year change in employment shares 
(calculated as hours supplied).
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not move monotonically toward higher wage occupations, instead it seems that 
 middle-earning occupations lost the most in terms of employment. Thus, employ-
ment polarization is present in the sense that the employment share in low- and 
high-wage occupations increased more (or decreased less) than in middle-wage 
occupations. Polarization in terms of employment is most pronounced in the last 
30 years (1980–2007), but it seems to be present even in the earlier periods.11
We focus on 30-year windows for two reasons. First, most of the literature doc-
uments polarization over periods longer than two decades. Second, we link polar-
ization to structural change, which is a long-run phenomenon. One concern with 
showing 30-year windows, as in Figure 1, is that they stay silent on the exact timing 
of when polarization started. To address this, we show the decade-by-decade version 
of this in Figure A-2 in online Appendix A. This figure shows that these patterns do 
not necessarily hold for a decade-by-decade analysis, neither in the earlier nor in 
the later part of the sample. In some decades the top gains, whereas in others the 
bottom gains, but it is never the middle that grows the most in terms of employment 
shares.12 However, between 1960 and 1970 there is clear evidence of polarization, 
therefore the early polarization patterns in the 30-year windows are not solely driven 
by changes after 1980.
A set of balanced occupational categories is needed to generate Figure 1. Meyer 
and Osborne (2005) develop a set of harmonized occupational codes for the 1950 to 
2000 census and the ACS data. Dorn (2009) aggregates Meyer and Osborne (2005) 
to achieve the finest possible balanced set of categories from 1980 onward. We base 
our categories on Meyer and Osborne (2005) and Dorn (2009) to similarly achieve 
the finest possible balanced set of occupations from 1950 onward. One concern 
with this approach is that despite the efforts of these authors, their harmonized and/
or balanced categories are not truly comparable across census years, and the reader 
might worry, that looking at a longer horizon, as we do, only exacerbates this prob-
lem. However, the biggest change in occupational classification occurred with the 
implementation of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) based occupa-
tion codes in the 2000 census, when the hierarchical structure of occupational codes 
was drastically modified. While in previous census years certain smaller occupation 
categories disappeared or entered, the main structure of occupations remained the 
same.13 Therefore looking at longer horizons does not worsen the comparability 
issue relative to existing literature, which typically focuses on the post-1980 period.
Nonetheless, to minimize the comparability issues of fine occupational catego-
ries arising from the reclassifications across census years, we aggregate up these 
fine categories to a coarser set of occupations. For these coarser categories there is 
less of a concern about the consistency over time. The bar charts in Figure 2 show 
ten broad occupational groups percentage changes in total hours worked and in the 
11 When ranking occupations in terms of the initial 1950 wage distribution, i.e., the initial wage distribution, 
as is commonly done in this literature, employment polarization is much more noticeable since the 1960s, see 
Figure A-1 in online Appendix A. 
12 The fact that over ten-year windows the polarization patterns do not hold for a very fine classification of occu-
pations is in line with the evidence in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see their Figure 10. Nonetheless, with a coarser 
classification of occupations, one sees polarization decade-by-decade, see Figure 2. 
13 See the documentation of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) Census data. 
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mean log wages over ten year intervals. This categorization follows Acemoglu and 
Autor (2011), who show with this methodology the employment changes post 1980. 
We follow their ranking of occupations: the right three groups are the most educated 
and highest paid occupations, the four in the middle are middle-skilled, while the 
three on the left are the least educated and lowest paid occupations.
We expand on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) in two ways: (i) by showing the 
trends in decennial employment growth from 1950 onward (in the top panel), and 
(ii) by also showing wage growth (bottom panel). While over 1950–1960, there is 
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Figure 2. Polarization in Broad Occupational Categories
note: These bar graphs show for ten broad occupational categories, as defined in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the 
decade-by-decade percentage change in hours worked (panel A) and in the mean log wages (panel B).
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no clear pattern in the employment growth of these broad occupational categories, 
from 1960 onward there is a U-shaped pattern. Total hours worked grew by more 
for occupations at the higher and at the lower end of the skill distribution than for 
those in the middle. A similar pattern is evident in the wage growth rates. Over 
each ten year period, wage growth was the lowest in middle-skilled occupations. We 
conclude that even when grouping occupations into broad categories following the 
methodology of Acemoglu and Autor (2011), there is evidence of employment and 
wage polarization as early as 1960.14
B. Polarization in Terms of Sectors
Next we document the polarization of employment and wages in terms of three 
broad industries or sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing, and high-skilled 
services.
Our classification for the manufacturing sector also includes mining and construc-
tion, as is common in the structural change literature (e.g., Herrendorf, Rogerson, 
and Valentinyi 2013). As mentioned in the introduction, we split the remaining 
(service) industries into two categories based on consumption side considerations: 
within sectors the industries should be close substitutes, whereas across sectors they 
should be complements. The categorization is also guided by differences on the 
production side; in low-end services workers have much less education and earn 
much lower wages than in high-end services. For this reason we refer to them as 
low-skilled and high-skilled services.15 As a result of the combined production- 
and consumption-side considerations, we classify as low-end services the follow-
ing industries: personal services, entertainment, low-skilled transport, low-skilled 
business and repair services, retail trade, and wholesale trade. High-end services 
comprise of professional and related services, finance, insurance and real estate, 
communications, high-skilled business services, utilities, high-skilled transport, and 
public administration.
Figure 3 documents the patterns of polarization both in terms of employment 
shares and wages for the above defined sectors between 1950–1960 and 2007. The 
bottom panel shows the path of employment shares: high-skilled services increase 
continuously, low-skilled services increase and manufacturing decreases from 
1960 onward.16 In terms of wages, we plot the sector premium in high-skilled and 
low-skilled services compared to manufacturing, as well as their 95 percent confi-
dence intervals. These sector premia are the exponents of the coefficients on sector 
dummies, which come from a regression of log wages where we also control for 
gender, race, and a polynomial in potential experience.17 We plot these rather than 
the relative average wages because in our quantitative exercise we do not aim to 
14 In Figure A-3 in online Appendix A, we document polarization in terms of occupations in an even coarser 
classification. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we classify occupation groups into three categories: man-
ual, routine, and abstract. Again, we find that the middle-earning group, the routine workers, lost both in terms of 
relative average wages and employment share to the benefit of manual and abstract workers. 
15 See Figure 3, as well as Figure A-4 and Table A-1, in online Appendix A. 
16 Between 1950 and 1960, manufacturing employment increased, and low-skilled service employment fell. 
17 See Table A-2 in online Appendix A.3 for details of the regression. 
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explain sectoral wage differentials that are potentially caused by age, gender, or 
racial  composition differences and the differential path of these across sectors.18 
18 One might be concerned that the employment share changes are driven by changes in the age, gender, or race 
composition of the labor force. To assess this, we generate counterfactual industry employment shares by fixing the 
industry employment share of each age-gender-race cell at its 1960 level, and allowing the employment shares of 
the cells to change. This exercise confirms that to a large extent the employment share changes are not driven by 
the compositional changes of the labor force. See Figure A-6 in online Appendix A.6. 
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Figure 3. Polarization for Broad Industries
notes: The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based on their 
industry code (for details of the industry classification, see text and online Appendix A.2). Panel A shows relative 
wages: the high-skilled service and the low-skilled service premium compared to manufacturing (and their 95 per-
cent confidence intervals), implied by the regression of log wages on gender, race, a polynomial in potential expe-
rience, and sector dummies. Panel B shows employment shares, calculated in terms of hours worked. The dashed 
vertical line represents 1960, from when on manufacturing employment has been contracting.
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As the graph shows, low-skilled service workers earn less, whereas high-skilled 
service workers earn more than manufacturing workers. Since the 1960s, both low- 
and high-skilled service workers have been gaining in terms of wages compared to 
manufacturing workers.19 To summarize, from 1960 onward there is clear polar-
ization in terms of these three sectors: the low- and high-skilled service workers 
gained in terms of employment and wages at the expense of the middle-earning, 
middle-skilled, manufacturing workers.
C. Polarization across Occupations Linked to industry Shifts
To quantify the contribution of sectoral employment shifts to each occupation’s 
employment share path, we conduct a standard shift-share decomposition.20 The 
overall change in the employment share of occupation  o between year 0 and  t , 
 Δ E ot =  E ot −  E o0 , can be expressed as
(1)  Δ E ot =  ∑ 
i
  λ oi Δ E it 
 ≡Δ E ot B
 +  ∑ 
i
 Δ  λ oit  E i 
 ≡Δ E ot W 
 , 
where  λ oit =  L oit / L it denotes the share of occupation  o , industry  i employment 
within industry  i employment at time  t ,  E it =  L it / L t denotes the share of industry 
i employment within total employment at time  t ,  Δ denotes the change between 
period 0 and  t , and the variables without a time subscript denote the average of the 
variable between period 0 and period  t . The term  Δ E o B represents the change in 
the employment share of occupation  o that is attributable to changes in industrial 
composition, i.e., structural transformation, while  Δ E o W reflects changes driven by 
within sector forces.
Table 1 shows for three broad occupational categories the total employment 
share change and its decomposition between 1950 or 1960 and 2007 into a between- 
industry and a within-industry component. We use either 3 occupational and 3 sec-
toral categories, or similarly to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), 10 occupations and 
11 industries to be sure that our results are not driven by the coarse categorization. 
This decomposition indicates that a significant part of the occupational employment 
share changes are driven by shifts in the industrial composition of the economy 
between 1950 and 2007. Between-industry shifts are the most important in man-
ual occupations, and the least important in abstract occupations, where they still 
account for at least a quarter of the total change.
The magnitude of the role of between-industry shifts in our analysis is similar to 
that in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014).21 
19 These trends are very robust, they hold in the raw data (see the left panel in Figure A-4 in online Appendix 
A.3) as well as when constructing the sector premia using different specifications of the log wage regression (see 
Table A-4 in Appendix A.4). 
20 An alternative way is to calculate how much occupational employment shares would have changed, if indus-
try employment shares would have remained at their 1960 level. See Figure A-6 in Appendix A.6. 
21 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) use US Census data between 1960 and 2000, and the ACS 2008 data. Their focus 
is the declining importance of between-industry shifts from 1960–1980 to 1980 –2007. We find some support for this 
in our decade-by-decade analysis shown in Table A-5 in online Appendix A.6. The relatively smaller contribution 
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Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) argue that part of the between-industry shifts 
can be driven by routinization, which is a within-industry phenomenon. Since routin-
ization has a bigger impact on industries where routine labor is used more intensively, 
employment might shift away from these industries. While this is a valid concern, 
routinization, linked to ICT, is not likely to be driving the faster productivity growth 
observed between the 1950s and 1980s. We also conduct an alternative  shift-share 
decomposition where we use sectoral value added shares instead of sectoral employ-
ment shares. Even though the importance of the between industry component is 
somewhat smaller than in the standard shift-share decomposition, it is nonetheless a 
substantial share of the overall change.22 We also decompose relative occupational 
wage changes into an occupation-driven component and an industry-driven compo-
nent. We define the relative average wage of occupation  o as the ratio of the occupa-
tion’s average wage relative to the average wage in routine occupations:23
  r w ot ≡  ∑ 
i
   L iot  ___ L ot  
 w it  ___ w rt  
 w iot  ____ w it  =  ∑ i  χ iot r  w it  p iot , 
of between-industry shifts in later periods might be due to routinization kicking in after the 1980s, thus  providing 
an extra force for within-industry reallocation of labor. Nonetheless, we find that even in the 1980 –2007 period, 
between-industry shifts explain a significant part of occupational employment share changes. Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons (2014) use data for 16 European countries between 1993 and 2010, and attribute a roughly equal role to 
between- and within-industry shifts in all occupations. 
22 See online Appendix A.7 for details. 
23 It is clear that the wage has to be a relative wage, otherwise the decomposition picks up the general upward 
trend in wages, and assigns it to the component, which includes a wage change. Since we are interested in the path 
of manual and abstract wages relative to routine wages, it is natural to normalize by the average wage in routine 
occupations. 
Table 1—Decomposition of Changes in Occupational Employment Shares
Employment shares
3 × 3 10 × 11
1950–2007 1960–2007 1950–2007 1960–2007
Manual
Total  Δ 2.98 5.68 2.98 5.68
Between  Δ 2.30 3.07 3.13 4.38
Within  Δ 0.67 2.61 −0.15 1.30
routine
Total  Δ −19.79 −19.14 −19.79 −19.14
Between  Δ −5.66 −6.32 −9.73 −10.01
Within  Δ −14.13 −12.82 −10.06 −9.13
Abstract
Total  Δ 16.81 13.46 16.81 13.46
Between  Δ 3.35 3.24 6.60 5.63
Within  Δ 13.46 10.21 10.21 7.83
notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change, the second 
presents the between-industry component, and the third presents the within-industry component over the period 
1950 or 1960 to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, the last two use 10 occupations 
and 11 industries. The 10 occupations are the same as in Figure 2, while the 11 industries are: personal services, 
entertainment, and low-skilled business and service repairs; low-skilled transport; retail trade; wholesale trade; 
extractive industries; construction; manufacturing; professional and related services and high-skilled business 
services; finance, insurance, and real estate; high-skilled transport and public utilities (incl. communications); and 
public administration.
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where  χ iot =  L iot / L ot is employment in industry  i and occupation  o in period  t 
 relative to employment in occupation  o in period  t ,  r  w it =  w it / w rt is the ratio of the 
average wage in industry  i in period  t relative to the average wage of routine occu-
pations in period  t , and  p iot =  w iot / w it is the premium of occupation  o in industry  i 
in period  t . In this three-way decomposition, the industry effect is itself composed of 
two parts: the first part captures changes coming from workers within an occupation 
moving across industries with different wages ( L iot / L it ). The second part captures 
that each industry’s relative average wage path ( w it / w rt ) influences the overall rela-
tive average wage of the occupation. The occupation effect is driven by the change 
in the occupational premium within each industry ( w iot / w it ).
Table 2 shows the change in manual and abstract wages relative to routine wages, 
and their decomposition into an industry and an occupation component, between 
1950 or 1960 and 2007. This table confirms that both manual and abstract occupa-
tions have been gaining in terms of wages relative to routine jobs. The decompo-
sition shows that between half and two-thirds of the gain in relative manual wages 
is driven by industry effects, by the reallocation of manual labor to higher paying 
industries, or by faster wage growth in industries where more manual workers are 
employed. For the increase in relative abstract wages the results are even more strik-
ing: all of the gain is driven by industry effects.24
To summarize, first we document that polarization defined over occupational cat-
egories both in terms of employment and wages has been present in the United 
States since the 1950s. Second we show that the same patterns are discernible in 
terms of three broad sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing, and high-skilled 
services. Finally, we show that over the last six decades a significant amount of the 
employment share changes and relative wage changes in occupations are driven by 
the (employment) shifts across industries.
In the remainder of the paper, we present a simple model of sorting and structural 
change to jointly explain the sectoral shifts in employment and the changes in aver-
age sectoral wages. We then calibrate the model to quantitatively assess how much 
of the polarization of sectoral employment and wages it can explain over the last 
fifty years, when feeding in sectoral labor productivity from the data.
II. Model
In order to illustrate the mechanism that is driving the polarization of wages and 
employment, we present a parsimonious static model, and analyze its behavior as 
productivity levels increase across sectors. The key novel feature of our model is that 
we assume that each sector values different skills in its production process. Relaxing 
the assumption of the homogeneity of labor allows us to derive predictions, not only 
about the employment and expenditure shares, but also about the relative average 
wages across sectors over time.
24 In general, there are three ways of conducting a three-way decomposition depending on which element one 
separates first. The other decompositions give virtually the same results, see online Appendix A.8. The decomposi-
tion of the decade-by-decade wage changes shows broadly similar patterns, see Table A-8 in online Appendix A-9.
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We assume that the economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, who all make 
individually optimal decisions about their sector of work. Every individual chooses 
their sector of work to maximize wages, in a Roy-model type setup. We assume that 
individuals are ex ante heterogeneous in their efficiency units of labor in low-skilled 
services, manufacturing, and high-skilled services, and, thus, endogenously sort into 
the sector where the return to their labor is the highest.
Furthermore these individuals are organized into a stand-in household, which 
maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint.25 Households derive utility 
from consuming high- and low-skilled services and manufacturing goods.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times: individuals make sec-
toral choices to maximize their wages, the stand-in household collects all wages and 
maximizes its utility by optimally allocating this income between low-skilled ser-
vices, manufacturing goods and high-skilled services. Production is perfectly com-
petitive, wages and prices are such that all markets clear. We analyze the qualitative 
and quantitative role of technological progress in explaining the observed sectoral 
wage and employment dynamics since the 1960s.
A. Sectors and Production
There are three sectors in the model: high-skilled services ( H ), manufactur-
ing ( M ), and low-skilled services ( L ). All goods and services are produced under 
perfect competition, and each sector uses only labor as an input into production. 
The technology to produce in each sector is
(2)  y j =  A j  n j  for j ∈ { L, M, H}, 
25 We make the assumption of a stand-in household purely for expositional purposes. Given that the preferences 
we use are homothetic (see Section IIB), the resulting sectoral demands are equal to the aggregation of individual 
demands. 
Table 2—Decomposition of Changes in Relative Occupational Wages
Relative wages
3 × 3 10 × 11
1950–2007 1960–2007 1950–2007 1960–2007
Manual/routine
Total  Δ 0.289 0.310 0.289 0.310
Industry  Δ 0.180 0.148 0.225 0.218
Occupation  Δ 0.108 0.162 0.064 0.093
Abstract/routine
Total  Δ 0.327 0.240 0.327 0.240
Industry  Δ 0.310 0.254 0.376 0.317
Occupation  Δ 0.016 −0.014 −0.050 −0.077
notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change, the second 
presents the industry component, and the third presents the occupation component over the period 1950 or 1960 
to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, columns three and four use 10 occupations and 
11 industries.
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where  A j is productivity and  n j is the total amount of efficiency units of labor ( efficiency labor for short) hired in sector  J for production. Sector  J firms are price 
takers, therefore the equilibrium wage per efficiency unit of labor (unit wage for 
short) in this sector has to satisfy
(3)  ω j =  ∂ p j  y j  _____∂ n j  =  p j  A j  for j ∈ { L, M, H}. 
Note that the wage of a worker with  a efficiency units of sector  J labor when work-
ing in sector  J is  a  ω j .
B. Labor Supply and Demand for Goods
The stand-in household consists of a measure one continuum of different types 
of members. Each member chooses which one of the three market sectors to supply 
his one unit of raw labor in. The household collects the wages of all its members 
and decides how much low-skilled services, manufacturing goods, and high-skilled 
services to buy on the market.
Sector of Work.—We assume that every member of the household works full time 
in one of the three market sectors. Since every member can work in any of the three 
sectors, and each member’s utility is increasing in his own wages (as well as in all 
other members’ wages), it is optimal for each worker to choose the sector that pro-
vides him with the highest wages.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their endowment of efficiency units of labor, 
 a ∈  핉 + 3 , which is drawn from a time invariant distribution  f (a) . This is an innate 
ability distribution, and as such is prior to any form of human capital that a worker 
might accumulate, for example, by acquiring education. Even though we do not 
model this explicitly, one could think of our model as having a reduced-form educa-
tional choice in the following sense. If a worker, given their ability, selects a sector, 
say  H , to work in, they will get education, or other qualifications, as necessary to 
enter that sector.26
The endowment,  a , determines each individual’s productivity in sectors  L, M , 
and  H . We assume that each dimension of ability corresponds to one sector, such 
that  a l ≡ a(1) denotes the individual’s efficiency units of labor in low-skilled ser-
vices,  a m ≡ a(2) in manufacturing, while  a h ≡ a(3) denotes his efficiency units 
in high-skilled services. Therefore the wage of an individual with  a = ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) 
efficiency units of labor if working in sector  J is  a j  ω j . Given wage rates  ω l ,  ω m , and ω h per efficiency unit of labor, the optimal decision of any agent can be character-
ized as follows.
26 Given that high-skilled services is the most intensive sector in college-educated workers, the increase in col-
lege education that the United States has witnessed over the last decades is in line with our model, as it generates an 
increase in the demand for high-skilled services, providing a link from structural change to educational attainment 
(see, for example, also Buera, Kaboski, and Rogerson 2015). 
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RESULT 1: Given unit wage rates  ω l ,  ω m , and  ω h , the optimal sector choice of indi-
viduals can be characterized by two relative unit wages:
  
 ω l  ___  ω m  and   
 ω h  ___ ω m  . 
it is optimal for an individual with  ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) efficiency units of labor to work in:
  •  sector  L if and only if
  (4)  a l ≥  1 ___   ω l  ___  ω m 
 a m   and    a l ≥   
 ω h  ___ ω m  ___  ω l  ___  ω m 
 a h . 
  •  sector  M if and only if
  (5)  a m ≥   ω l  ___  ω m  a l   and    a m ≥  
 ω h  ___ ω m   a h . 
  •  sector  H if and only if
  (6)  a h ≥   
 ω l  ___  ω m  ___  ω h  ___ ω m 
 a l   and    a h ≥  1 ___   ω h  ___ ω m 
 a m .
Figure 4 shows this endogenous sorting behavior. The left panel shows that for 
a given efficiency in high-skilled services,  a h 0 , individuals who have relatively low 
efficiency in both manufacturing and low-skilled services sort into  H (the horizon-
tally striped area), those with relatively higher efficiency in low-skilled services 
sort into  L (the dotted area), while those with relatively higher efficiency in manu-
facturing sort into  M (the vertically striped area). The middle and right panel show 
the same for a given manufacturing and low-skilled service efficiency. The compar-
ative statics of optimal sorting with respect to changes in the relative unit wages is 
straightforward.
The optimal sector of work choices of individuals determine the effective labor 
supplies in the three markets:
(7)  n l (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0   ω l  ___  ω m a l   ∫ 0   
  ω l  ___  ω m  ___  ω h  ___ ω m 
a l   a l  f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a h d a m d a l ,
(8)  n m (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0   
1 ___   ω l  ___  ω m 
a m   ∫ 
0
   
1 ___   ω h  ___ ω m 
a m   a m  f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a h d a l d a m ,
(9)  n h (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0   
  ω h  ___ ω m  ___  ω l  ___  ω m 
a h   ∫ 
0
    ω h  ___ ω m  a h   a h  f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a m d a l d a h . 
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The effective labor supply in sector  J is the total amount of sector  J efficiency units, 
a j , supplied to that sector. This is not measurable in the data, but we observe hours 
worked, which corresponds to the raw labor supply or employment share in the 
model. These employment shares are the mass of individuals who supply their labor 
in the given sectors:
(10)  L l (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0    ω l  ___  ω m a l   ∫ 0   
  ω l  ___  ω m  ___  ω h  ___ ω m 
a l   f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a h d a m d a l ,
(11)  L m (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0   
1 ___   ω l  ___  ω m 
a m   ∫ 
0
   
1 ___   ω h  ___ ω m 
a m   f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a h d a l d a m ,
(12)  L h (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m  ) =  ∫ 0 ∞  ∫ 0   
  ω h  ___ ω m  ___  ω l  ___  ω m 
a h   ∫ 
0
    ω h  ___ ω m  a h   f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) d a m d a l d a h . 
In a similar vein,  ω l ,  ω m , and  ω h are the sectoral unit wages, which are in general 
also not observed in the data, but sectoral average wages are. These are simply the 
total earnings in a sector divided by the mass of people working in the sector, or 
equivalently the unit wage times the average worker efficiency ( _ a j =  n j / L j ) in the 
given sector:
(13)  _ w j  =   ω j  n j  ____ L j  ≡  ω j  
_ a j  for  j ∈ { L, M, H}. 
Demand for consumption Goods and Services.—Household members derive 
utility from low-skilled services, manufacturing goods, and high-skilled services. 
H
H
H
M
M
ML L
L
  ω h  __  ω m  ah0 
   ω h  ___ ω m ___  ω l ___ ω m ah
0
 a m  a m  a h
 a l  a l  a h 
  ω l  __  ω m a l
 1 __   ω h  __ ω m am
0
 1 __   ω l  __  ω m am
0
  
 ω l  ___  ω m  ___  ω h  ___ ω m  al
 
 ω l  __  ω m al0
 
 ω h  __ ω m  ah
  
 ω l  ___  ω m  ___  ω h  ___ ω m  al
0
Figure 4. Optimal Sector of Work
notes: This figure depicts the optimal sector of work choices as a function of  ω l / ω m and  ω h / ω m from these perspec-
tives. The left panel shows, for a given  a h 
0 value, the optimal sector choice for all { a l ,  a m } pairs. The middle panel 
shows, for a given  a m 
0 value, the optimal sector choice for all { a l ,  a h } pairs. The right panel shows, for a given  a l 0 
value, the optimal sector choice for all { a h ,  a m } pairs. The dotted areas are where  L is the optimal sector, the verti-
cally striped areas show where  M is optimal, and the horizontally striped areas show where  H is optimal.
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The household allocates total income earned by household members to maximize 
the following utility:
  max  c l ,  c m ,  c h  
  u ( [ θ l  c l  ε−1 ___ε  +  θ m  c m  ε−1 ___ε  +  θ h  c h  ε−1 ___ε  ] 
 ε ___ ε−1 ) 
subject to
 p l  c l +  p m  c m +  p h  c h ≤  ω l  n l +  ω m  n m +  ω h  n h ,
where  u is any monotone increasing function;  ω l  L l +  ω m  n m +  ω h  n h are the total 
wages of household members; and  p l ,  p m , and  p h are the prices of the low-skilled 
services, the manufacturing goods, and the high-skilled services.
The household’s optimal consumption bundle has to satisfy
(14)   c l  ___ c m   =  (  p l  ___  p m   θ m  ___ θ l  ) 
−ε
 ,
(15)   c h  ___ c m   =  (  p h  ___ p m    θ m  ___ θ h ) 
−ε
 . 
C. competitive Equilibrium and Structural change
A competitive equilibrium is given by relative unit wage rates  {  ω l / ω m ,  ω h / ω m } , 
prices  {  p l ,  p m ,  p h } , and consumption demands  { c l ,  c m ,  c h } , given productivities 
 { A l ,  A m ,  A h } , where individuals, households, and firms make optimal decisions, and 
all markets clear.
Using goods market clearing in all sectors ( y j =  c j for  j ∈ { L, M, H } ), where 
the supply is given by (2), and the market clearing unit wage rates, (3), in the house-
hold’s optimality conditions, (14) and (15), we obtain the following:
   A l  ___  A m  
 n l  ___ n m   =   (  ω l  ___  ω m   A m  ___ A l   ⏟= p l / p m 
  θ m  ___ θ l  ) 
−ε
 ,
   A h  ___ A m   
 n h  ___ n m   =   (  ω h  ___ ω m    A m  ___ A h  ⏟= p h / p m 
  θ m  ___ θ h ) 
−ε
 . 
The left-hand side is the relative supply, while the right-hand side is the relative 
demand for low- and, respectively, high-skilled services compared to manufactur-
ing. A change in the relative productivity affects both the relative supply and the 
relative demand.
An increase in relative manufacturing productivity compared to low-skilled ser-
vice productivity ( A m / A l ) has two direct effects: (i) it reduces the relative supply 
of low-skilled services, ( y l / y m ), and (ii) through an increase in the relative price of 
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low-skilled services (  p l / p m ), it lowers the relative demand for low-skilled services. 
If low-skilled services and manufacturing goods are complements,  ε < 1 , the effect 
through relative prices is the weaker one, and relative supply falls by more than 
relative demand. To restore equilibrium, the relative supply of low-skilled services 
has to increase and/or its relative demand has to fall compared to manufacturing.
In order for the relative supply to increase, the efficiency units of labor hired in 
low-skilled services have to increase relative to manufacturing, which requires a rise 
in the relative unit wage,  ω l / ω m . At the same time, a rise in the relative unit wage 
also increases the relative price of low-skilled services, thus lowering the relative 
demand. Similarly, an increase in  A m / A h , through its effect on relative supply and 
relative demand requires a rise in  ω h / ω m .
Using the optimal sorting of individuals, (7), (8), and (9), we obtain the following 
expressions, which allow us to formally analyze the comparative static properties of 
the equilibrium:
(16)   n l ( 
 ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m )   __________ n m (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m ) 
  (  ω l  ___  ω m ) 
ε  =  (  A m  ___ A l  ) 
1−ε
  (  θ m  ___ θ l  ) 
−ε
 ,
(17)   n h ( 
 ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m )   __________ n m (  ω l  ___  ω m ,   ω h  ___ ω m ) 
  (  ω h  ___ ω m  ) 
ε  =  (  A m  ___ A h ) 
1−ε
  (  θ m  ___ θ h ) 
−ε
 . 
These two equations implicitly define the relative unit wages,  ω l / ω m and  ω h / ω m , and 
in turn these fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
PROPOSITION 1: When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are 
complements ( ε < 1 ), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in 
the two types of services ( d A m / A m > d A h / A h = d A l / A l ) leads to a change in the 
optimal sorting of individuals across sectors. in particular,  ω l / ω m and  ω h / ω m unam-
biguously increase, while  ω l / ω h can rise or fall. This results in an unambiguous 
increase in efficiency labor in  L and in  H , and a reduction in efficiency and raw 
labor in  M .
PROOF:
Total differentiation of (16) and (17). See online Appendix B for details.  ∎ 
Proposition 1 confirms the results of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) in terms of effi-
ciency labor, rather than raw labor or employment shares: when sectoral outputs are 
complements in consumption, effective labor inputs need to increase in the sectors that 
become relatively less productive. As manufacturing productivity grows the fastest, 
efficiency labor has to move out of manufacturing into both low- and high-skilled ser-
vices. Since individuals optimally sort into the sector with the highest return for them, 
this implies that the equilibrium relative unit wages have to adjust. Proposition 1 states 
what these adjustments entail. The adjustment to the new equilibrium requires sector 
M to be squeezed from both sides,  ω l / ω m and  ω h / ω m have to increase. This is very 
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 intuitive: sector  M has to shrink, while sectors  L and  H have to expand, which requires 
sector  M unit wages to fall both relative to sector  H and sector  L unit wages. This 
implies that in sector  M not only efficiency units of labor, but also the raw employment 
(share) falls, while the employment share of overall services expands. It is worthwhile 
to note that these results hold for any underlying distribution of efficiency units of 
labor,  f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) . However, in general, it is ambiguous whether the boundary between 
L and  H shifts up or down ( ω l / ω h increases or decreases), and, thus, also whether the 
employment share of both  L and  H increases. Since, in general, the boundary between 
sectors  L and  H changes, one of the sectors loses workers to the other sector, which 
might imply that the employment share of one of the service sectors falls. The effective 
employment of both service sectors unambiguously increases, as their gain from sector 
M always outweighs their potential loss to the other service sector.
In terms of relative average wages, in general, it is not possible to sign the changes 
predicted by the model. The reason is self-selection; the workers leaving manufac-
turing are the ones that have a relatively low efficiency. As a consequence, the aver-
age efficiency in manufacturing increases when its employment share decreases. 
This tends to increase the average wage in manufacturing compared to the other 
sectors, offsetting to some extent the direct effect of the falling relative manufac-
turing unit wage. Without further assumptions, it is conceivable that the indirect 
effect through the average efficiency might overturn the direct effect of changing 
unit wages. To see this, consider the average low- (high)-skilled service wage rela-
tive to the average manufacturing wage (from (13)):
  
 _ w j  ____  w m  =  
 ω j   n j  __ L j  _____ ω m   n m  ___ L m 
 =   ω j  ___  ω m  
 _ a j  ___  a m   for  j ∈ { L, H }. 
From Proposition 1 we know that  ω j / ω m increases. Due to the changing nature of 
self-selection, average efficiency in  M increases, while in  J it decreases, thus, in 
general, the change in average low- (high)-skilled service wages relative to average 
manufacturing wages is ambiguous. In general, the overall direction of change of 
the relative average wages depends on the exact form of the underlying distribution. 
We explore the change in relative average wages in more detail in the quantitative 
analysis, and in all our simulations the relative average wages (for both  L and  H to 
M ) move in the same direction as the relative unit wages.
Since the structural change literature focuses on employment shares and value 
added shares, we also investigate our model’s implications for relative value added. 
We can show that relative sectoral value added shares increase in the sectors with 
lower productivity growth if the sectoral outputs are complements in consumption.
PROPOSITION 2: When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are 
complements ( ε < 1 ), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in the 
two types of services ( d A m / A m > d A h / A h = d A l / A l ) increases the relative value 
added in both high- and low-skilled services compared to manufacturing:
  d   p h  y h  _____ p m  y m  > 0  and  d  
 p l  y l  _____ p m  y m  > 0. 
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These results can be understood by considering the following. In this model, sectoral 
value added is equal to the sectoral wage bill:  p i  y i =  p i  A i  n i =  ω i  n i . Proposition 
1 tells us for  j ∈ { L, H} that  ω j / ω m increases, that  n j increases, and  n m falls. Both 
relative unit wages and effective labor changes increase the value added output of 
sector  J relative to sector  M .
The sectoral value added can be further expressed as  p i  y i =  ω i  n i =  _ w i  L i , 
since the sectoral wage bill can be expressed as either sectoral unit wage times sec-
toral efficiency labor, or as sectoral average wage times sectoral raw labor. Using 
this latter expression we can show that
  
 p i  y i  ____ p j  y j =  
 _ w i  ___  w j  
 L i  __ L j . 
According to our model, relative sectoral value added has to equal the product of 
relative sectoral average wages and relative sectoral employment shares. This result 
holds even if we include capital in the model, unless one assumes either imperfect 
capital mobility across sectors, or different sectoral capital intensities. Since in the 
data the relative sectoral value added does not equal the product of relative sectoral 
average wages and employment shares, in our calibration we target relative average 
wages and sectoral employment shares, as it is the evolution of these two measures 
that is the focus of our paper.
III. Quantitative Results
In this section, we quantitatively assess the contribution of structural transfor-
mation to the polarization of employment and wages across sectors. To do this 
we consider the evolution of the competitive equilibrium in terms of employment 
shares and relative average sectoral wages as productivity increases in manufac-
turing and in both low- and high-skilled services. We calibrate our parameters to 
match key moments in 1960, and then feed in the exogenous process for labor 
productivity to generate predictions for the evolution of employment and wages. 
We choose 1960 as the starting point for the quantitative evaluation of the model 
because, as documented in Section IB, the contraction of manufacturing employ-
ment is apparent in our data from 1960 onward. We first describe the data targets 
and the calibration strategy, and then discuss the quantitative importance of our 
mechanism.
A. calibration
Four of the key moments are calculated from the 1960 census data. These are 
the relative average sectoral wages,  
_ w l /  _ w m and  _ w h /  _ w m , and the sectoral employ-
ment shares,  L l ,  L m , and  L h , which sum to one. Employment shares are calculated 
as share of hours worked, and relative average wages are the sector premia, both as 
in Section IB. The fifth moment is the dispersion of the non-transitory component 
78 AMEricAn EcOnOMic JOUrnAL: MAcrOEcOnOMicS JAnUAry 2018
of log non-agricultural wages, as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013), which we estimate 
from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from the years 1968–1975.27
All parameters are time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time 
is labor productivity growth. The following parameters need to be calibrated: the 
parameters of the utility function  θ l ,  θ m ,  θ h , ε , the distribution of labor efficiencies, 
f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) , and the initial sectoral labor productivities,  A l (0),  A m (0),  A h (0) .
We proceed in two steps. First, we calibrate the underlying distribution of labor 
efficiencies under the assumption that the 1960 employment shares are met. Second, 
given the distribution of labor efficiencies, we calibrate the utility function and ini-
tial productivity parameters to match the 1960 employment shares.
The main idea behind the first step of the calibration is the following. For 
any given distribution,  f ( a l ,  a m ,  a h ) , there is a unique pair of relative unit wages, 
 {  ω l / ω m ,  ω h / ω m } , which results in the employment shares observed in the data in 
1960. These relative unit wages in turn imply all the wages in the economy, includ-
ing sectoral relative average wages and overall wage dispersion. We calibrate the 
parameters of the distribution to guarantee that if the observed employment shares 
are matched, then so are the relative average wages in 1960 and the dispersion of 
log wages.
For the baseline calibration we assume that labor efficiencies are drawn from a 
trivariate lognormal distribution. This assumption is not innocuous, but there are 
several reasons that support this choice. First, the lognormal distribution is partic-
ularly important in the selection literature (e.g., Roy 1951, Heckman and Sedlacek 
(1985), Borjas (1987), Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008). Second, empirical wage 
distributions are skewed to the right and typically resemble a lognormal distribution. 
Assuming that the underlying distribution of abilities is trivariate lognormal does 
not guarantee that after selection the resulting one dimensional wage distribution is 
also going to be lognormal. Nonetheless, under our parametrization the model gen-
erates a wage distribution that resembles those we see in reality, in particular, it has 
a long right tail. Third, the trivariate lognormal distribution allows for a very flexible 
correlation structure, the quantitative effect of which we explore.
Without loss of generality we normalize the mean of  a l ,  a m , and  a h to be unity.28 
Given these assumptions, the six parameters of the variance-covariance matrix are 
left to be calibrated. Let  σ j denote the standard deviation of efficiency in sector  J , 
and  ρ jk the correlation between sector  J and sector  K efficiency. In our baseline cali-
bration we set all pairwise correlations between workers’ sectoral efficiencies to 0.3. 
For this set of correlations—over which we conduct extensive robustness checks 
in Section IIIC—we calibrate the three variance parameters of the distribution to 
match the relative average wages in 1960 and the dispersion of log wages.29
27 We rely on PSID panel data, as it is not possible to calculate this parameter in cross-sectional census data. We 
use data for the first eight years, which are available in the PSID, as we want to be as close to 1960 as possible, and 
to have a large enough sample size. See online Appendix C.1 for the details of this estimation. 
28 For the trivariate log normal distribution, numerical simulations show that the path of employment shares and 
of relative average wages is independent from the level of these means. 
29 We use sectoral log wage dispersion only to calibrate the variance-covariance matrix of the underlying 
 distribution of abilities. As our interest is in the evolution of employment shares and relative average wages, we 
leave the analysis of the implications of structural change for overall and sectoral wage dispersion for future work. 
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The parameters of the utility function and the initial labor productivities are 
left to be calibrated. Previous literature has found a very low elasticity of substi-
tution between goods and services when output is measured in consumption value 
added terms. Ngai and Pissarides (2008) find that plausible estimates are in the 
range  (0, 0.3) , while Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013) find a value of 
ε = 0.002 . While neither these papers, nor others in the literature, have estimated 
the elasticity for our sector classification, we use  ε = 0.002 in our baseline calibra-
tion, and conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. Of the remain-
ing six parameters,  θ l ,  θ m ,  θ h , and  A l (0),  A m (0),  A h (0) only two ratios matter for 
the equilibrium of this economy, as can be seen from equations (16) and (17). We 
calibrate  τ l ≡  ( A m (0)/ A l (0)) 1−ε  ( θ l / θ m ) ε and  τ h ≡  ( A m (0)/ A h (0)) 1−ε  ( θ h / θ m ) ε to 
match the unit wages in 1960 found in the first step of the calibration. The calibrated 
parameters are summarized in Table 3.
It is well-known that if individuals self-select based on their endowments of effi-
ciency units and one cannot observe these efficiency units, then the measurement 
of changes in average wages or in labor productivity will be biased.30 In our model, 
expanding sectors soak up, while contracting sectors shed, relatively less efficient 
workers. This implies that the average efficiency in manufacturing increases, while 
the average efficiency in low- and high-skilled services falls over time, which—if 
left uncorrected—leads to an overestimation of productivity growth in manufactur-
ing relative to both types of services.31 To understand the potential magnitude of 
this bias, we correct for this selection effect, and report both measured and model 
implied productivity growth rates.
Similarly to Ngai and Petrongolo (2014), we measure labor productivity growth 
by dividing the growth rate of industry-level quantity indices from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) with the growth rate of industry-level hours worked data 
from the census/ACS data, and aggregating it up to our three sectors. Our model 
output can be written as  y j =  A j  n j =  B j  L j for each sector  J , where  L j is the raw 
30 Carneiro and Lee (2011) estimated the bias in the measurement of the skill premium, while Young (2014) 
pointed this out in the context of measuring productivity growth differentials across sectors. 
31 This is true only when manufacturing employment is shrinking, and low- and high-skilled service employ-
ment is expanding. 
Table 3—Calibrated Parameters
Description Value
 ρ lm Correlation between  L and  M sector efficiency   0.3 
 ρ lh Correlation between  L and  H sector efficiency   0.3 
 ρ mh Correlation between  M and  H sector efficiency   0.3 
 σ l 2 Variance of  L sector efficiency   0.12 
 σ m 2 Variance of  M sector efficiency   0.30 
 σ h 2 Variance of  H sector efficiency   0.35 
 ε CES between  L, M, and  H in consumption   0.002 
 τ l Relative weight on  L   0.54 
 τ h Relative weight on  H   0.84 
notes: The correlation values are set at  0.3 , and the elasticity of substitution,  ε, is taken from 
the literature. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the sectoral employment 
shares, the relative average wages, and the overall dispersion of wages.
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employment share (hours worked) and  B j the measured labor productivity, while  A j 
is the true productivity in the model and  n j the efficiency units of labor. To account 
for the difference between  n j and  L j —the selection effect—we compute the path of 
the  A j s in the following way. Given the calibration of all of the fixed parameters of 
the model, we find the path of  A j s such that the model implied growth in  B j s is equal 
to the labor productivity growth measured in the data.
Table 4 shows, in the first three columns, the model implied, and in the last three 
columns, the measured average annual labor productivity growth in low-skilled ser-
vices, manufacturing, and high-skilled services for each decade between 1960 and 
2007, as well as for the entire period. According to our calculations the growth of 
labor productivity in manufacturing was higher than in either low- or high-skilled 
services in each of the decades considered. Under our calibration, the bias in the rel-
ative productivity differentials is small, but not negligible.32 It is worth to note that 
both productivity growth and the relative productivity growth across sectors varied 
significantly decade by decade. For this reason, we evaluate the quantitative perfor-
mance of the model in two ways: (i) by plugging in the average annual growth rates 
for the entire period; and (ii) by plugging in the decennial growth rates.
B. Wage and Employment Dynamics
To understand the strength of the mechanisms that we highlight, we simulate 
the competitive equilibrium of the economy at different productivity levels. We fix 
the preference and the sectoral efficiency distribution parameters at their calibrated 
values, and feed in the labor productivity growth shown in Table 4. Our ultimate 
interest is the endogenous path of employment shares and relative average wages.
Figure 5 plots the dynamics for our baseline calibration using average annual 
growth rates over the period 1960–2007, adjusted for selection (bottom left numbers 
in Table 4). The top left panel shows (in logs) the path of both the measured pro-
ductivity (in the data and the model) in dotted lines, and the model productivity in 
32 Young (2014) finds that the implied bias might potentially be so large as to overturn the conventional wisdom 
of faster productivity growth in manufacturing. However, with our calibration this is not the case. 
Table 4 —Annual Average Labor Productivity Growth
Adjusted for selection Based on raw labor
  A l   A m   A h    B l   B m   B h 
1960 –1970 1.0077 1.0248 1.0132 1.0068 1.0279 1.0124
1970 –1980 1.0095 1.0140 1.0116 1.0093 1.0148 1.0116
1980 –1990 1.0051 1.0235 1.0108 1.0042 1.0270 1.0101
1990 –2000 1.0265 1.0271 1.0120 1.0270 1.0286 1.0083
2000 –2007 1.0072 1.0282 1.0162 1.0062 1.0320 1.0163
1960 –2007 1.0113 1.0231 1.0125 1.0109 1.0258 1.0115
notes: Labor productivity growth rates in the last three columns are calculated by dividing industry-level quantity 
indices from the BEA with industry-level employment growth data taken from the census/ACS, and aggregating 
up to our three sectors. The first three columns give the path of model productivity growth, which for our baseline 
calibration result in the same measured labor productivity growth as in the data.
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solid lines for all three sectors. Since productivity growth is highest in the manufac-
turing sector, but manufactured goods and both types of services are complements 
in consumption, the increased demand for the output of all sectors in equilibrium 
is met through a reallocation of labor toward low- and high-skilled services, as we 
showed in Proposition 1. 33 The increased demand for labor in low- and high-skilled 
services puts an upward pressure on the unit wages in these sectors relative to the 
unit wage in manufacturing, which we plot in the top right panel.
The bottom two panels show our model’s predictions (solid lines) contrasted with 
the data (dashed lines) for our measures of interest. Not surprisingly, the model 
matches the 1960 employment shares (bottom left panel) and the 1960 relative aver-
age wages (bottom right panel) very well, as we targeted these measures. But the 
model also does well in predicting the paths of employment shares and relative 
33 In Proposition 1, we assumed that productivity growth in the two types of services was equal. In the quantita-
tive evaluation of the model, we relax this assumption and take productivity growth from the data. Nonetheless, the 
results derived in the proposition hold in all our simulations. 
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Figure 5. Transition of the Benchmark Model
notes: Panel A shows the observed average change in log labor productivity (dotted line) and model productivity 
(solid line). Panel B shows the endogenous response of the relative average unit wages. Panel C shows the predicted 
employment shares (solid line) and their actual path (dashed line), while Panel D shows the model predicted (solid 
line) and actual path (dashed line) of the relative average sectoral wages.
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 average wages after 1960. Our baseline model predicts at least 60 percent of the 
change in the employment share of each sector.34
In our model, the relative average wage changes are driven by changes in the 
relative unit wages and changes in the relative average sectoral labor efficien-
cies. As discussed in Section IIC, these two effects, in general, go in opposite 
directions, however, the direct effect of the unit wages typically dominates the 
indirect effect that it has on average sectoral efficiencies. This is the case in our 
baseline calibration as well, and our model overall predicts about 33 percent of 
the growth in the relative low-skilled service sector wages, and 59 percent of the 
growth in the relative average high-skilled service sector wages compared to 
manufacturing.35
The path of employment shares and relative average wages generated by the 
model are very smooth compared to the data. This is not surprising, as we assumed 
a constant annual growth rate of sectoral labor productivity between 1960 and 2007. 
However, Table 4 reveals that the growth rates have varied substantially over time. 
Figure 6 shows the simulated model contrasted with the data when feeding in the 
model productivity growth rates calculated for each period. The main difference in 
terms of productivity growth rates is that the growth rate in low-skilled services is 
very low in the initial decades, and it is very high between 1990 and 2000, when it 
is almost the same as in manufacturing. Another important thing to note is that the 
growth rate in high-skilled services is also quite high between 2000 and 2007. These 
changing productivity differences imply that initially high-skilled service employ-
ment expands more slowly, while low-skilled services expand more rapidly, and this 
pattern is reversed in 1990. While the model quantitatively does worse in the initial 
decades, the overall predicted changes are the same.
As discussed in Section IIC, while our model qualitatively matches the changes 
in expenditure shares, a model without capital intensity differences and with perfect 
capital mobility across sectors cannot match the level of sectoral relative average 
wages, employment, and expenditure shares jointly. Figure 7 shows the relative 
value added in low- and high-skilled services compared to the value added in manu-
facturing in the model (solid line) and in the data (dashed line) for the time-invariant 
productivity growth rates. The overall increase in high-skilled services relative to 
manufacturing is replicated quite well, while for low-skilled services, the model 
over predicts the increase.36
C. robustness checks
In our baseline calibration we assume that the correlation between any two of 
the underlying sectoral efficiency draws is 0.3, that the underlying distribution of 
34 In the data, the percentage point change in the employment share of high-skilled services, manufacturing, and 
low-skilled services are 12, −20, and 8, in our model these numbers are 8, −15, and 8, respectively. 
35 In the data, the relative average wage of  L and  H compared to  M workers increased by 14 and, respectively, 
21 percent. In the simulation, this is 8 percent for  L to  M (25 percent improvement in relative unit wages and 13 per-
cent decline in relative average efficiency), and 7 percent for  H to  M (28 percent increase in relative unit wages and 
a more than 15 percent drop in relative average efficiency). 
36 For  H to  M these numbers are 125 percent in the data, and 112 percent in the model, and for  L to  M 38 percent 
in the data and 120 percent in the model. 
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 abilities is trivariate lognormal, and that the elasticity of substitution in consumption 
is 0.002. Before we analyze the sensitivity of our results to the these assumptions, 
we first show that given our calibration strategy the model implied path of employ-
ment shares is independent of the assumed correlations and the assumed underlying 
distribution of abilities.
We calibrate the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
distribution, and a combination of the utility function parameters and of the initial 
model productivities to match—among other targets—the employment shares in 
1960. Thus, by construction, in the initial period the model implied employment 
shares are the same across all calibrations. Moreover, the model-implied path of 
employment shares is independent of the underlying ability distribution. This is 
due to the way we correct for selection effects in the measurement of sectoral 
productivity growth. In particular, the  A j s are such that—conditional on all fixed 
parameters—the model implied raw labor productivity growth ( B j ) is equal to that 
measured in the data. This implies that the model implied growth in the  B j s is also 
the same across all calibrations. This implies that as long as  ε is the same across 
calibrations, the model implied path of employment shares is also the same, as we 
show below.
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Figure 6. Transition of the Model with Decennial Growth
note: The panels show the path of the same variables as in Figure 5, except that we feed in the change in labor pro-
ductivity decade-by-decade, rather than the average for the entire period.
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The model implied labor productivity growth can directly be matched to the 
model implied employment shares. To see how employment is allocated across sec-
tors, consider the social planner’s problem:
  max  n lt ,  n mt ,  n ht  
  u ( [ θ l  c lt  ε−1 ___ε  +  θ m  c mt  ε−1 ___ε  +  θ h  c ht  ε−1 ___ε  ] 
 ε ___ ε−1 ) ,
 subject to  c jt =  A jt  n jt =  B jt  L jt  for any j = L, M, H. 
The social planner’s problem can be formulated either as choosing the efficiency 
units of labor assigned to each sector given the  A j s or as choosing the employment 
shares given the  B j s.37 The first-order conditions in terms of employment shares can 
be written as
   L jt  ___ L kt  =  (  θ k  __ θ j ) 
−ε
  (  B kt  ___ B jt ) 
1−ε
 =  (  θ k  __ θ j ) 
−ε
  (  B k0  ___ B j0 ) 
1−ε
  
⎛
 ⎜
⎝
  B kt  ___ B k0  ___
  B jt  ___ B j0 
⎞
 ⎟
⎠
1−ε
 
 =   L j0  ___ L k0  
⎛
 ⎜
⎝
  B kt  ___ B k0  ___
  B jt  ___ B j0 
⎞
 ⎟
⎠
1−ε
  for any t and j, k ∈ { L, M, H}. 
37 Note that the path of  A j s depends on the underlying distribution of abilities. 
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Figure 7. Transition of Relative Low- and High-Skilled Service Value Added
note: The graph shows the value added in low- and high-skilled services relative to manufacturing as predicted by 
the model (solid line) and in the data (dashed line).
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The last equality makes use of the fact that for all distributions  τ l and  τ h are cal-
ibrated such that the initial  L l ,  L m , and  L h are matched. This equation shows that 
given the growth rate of the measured labor productivity, as long as  ε is the same 
across calibrations, the path of employment shares do not depend on the underlying 
distribution of sectoral efficiencies. Therefore, we only report the path of relative 
average wages when conducting the sensitivity analysis with respect to the sectoral 
efficiency distribution.
Figure 8 summarizes the sensitivity of relative average wage paths to the assumed 
correlation structure, along with Table A-10 in online Appendix C-2. While aver-
age wages relative to manufacturing increase in both the high- and the low-skilled 
service sector for all calibrations, the magnitude of these changes varies quite a bit. 
In Figure 8, the top left panel shows the wages for our baseline calibration (solid 
lines), which features a correlation of 0.3 between the underlying ability draws of 
any two sectors, along with one where this correlation is 0 (dotted lines) and 0.6 
(dashed lines). This graph shows that while relative average high-skilled service 
wages increase a bit less when the correlation is higher, the path of relative wages 
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Figure 8. Transition under Different Correlation Structures
notes: The set of lines marked with H show the average wage in high-skilled services relative to manufacturing, 
and the set of lines marked with L show the relative average wage of low-skilled services. The thin solid line shows 
the data, the thicker solid line shows our baseline calibration, whereas the dotted line represents the path for a lower 
correlation (0), and the dashed line for a higher correlation (0.6).
86 AMEricAn EcOnOMic JOUrnAL: MAcrOEcOnOMicS JAnUAry 2018
in  low-skilled services is hardly affected. Looking at the corresponding lines (top, 
 middle bold and last) in Table A-10, we can see that the higher correlation we 
assume, the calibration requires a less dispersed underlying efficiency distribution. 
With a less dispersed and more correlated distribution, the model predicts a smaller 
adjustment in the relative average sectoral wages, as the model gets closer to the 
case of homogeneous labor (i.e., similar to Ngai and Pissarides 2007). In the lim-
iting case, where each individual is endowed with the same amount of efficiency 
units of labor in all three sectors, there is no selection. In order to have positive 
labor supply to all three sectors, unit wages have to be equalized. As unit wages 
are equalized, individuals are indifferent between working in any of the three sec-
tors. Labor supply across sectors is random, average sectoral wages are equalized, 
implying relative average wages are independent of the level of technology in the 
economy. Thus, it is not surprising that our model predicts smaller changes in rel-
ative average wages when we assume higher correlations across all three pairs of 
sectoral abilities.
In the other three panels of Figure 8, we show the relative average wage paths 
when only modifying one of the baseline correlations to 0 (dotted) and 0.6 (dashed): 
in the top right panel it is the correlation between sector  L and  M ability, in the 
bottom left it is between  M and  H , and in the bottom right it is between  L and  H . 
These graphs show that in general the relative high-skilled service wages are more 
sensitive to the correlation structure, but the differences in the relative average wage 
paths are not large.
In our baseline calibration, we assume that the underlying distribution of abilities 
is trivariate lognormal. At the beginning of this section we showed that the path of 
employment shares is independent of the assumed distribution of underlying abil-
ities. However, the quantitative—and potentially even the qualitative—predictions 
regarding relative average wages are likely to be affected by not only the correlation 
structure, but also the functional form of the distribution. We recalibrate the model 
assuming a normal distribution, truncated at zero for all three abilities, for the same 
set of correlations as in Figure 8. As Table A-11 in online Appendix C.2 shows, 
our model predicts much larger changes in relative average wages when assuming 
that the underlying efficiencies are drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The 
model overpredicts the change in the relative low-skilled service wage by 35 to 
79 percent, while for relative high-skilled services wages it predicts between 88 and 
112 percent of the change.
In our baseline calibration, we use  ε = 0.002 for the elasticity of substitution 
between goods and services (measured in value-added terms) as estimated by 
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), which is at the lower end of estimates 
reported by Ngai and Pissarides (2008). To see whether our results are robust to 
higher, yet plausible, values of this parameter, we explore how our results change 
when using  ε = 0.02 or  ε = 0.2 , naturally recalibrating the other parameters to 
match our five targets. Figure 9 shows that qualitatively the transition paths look 
exactly the same. A higher elasticity of substitution implies that the effective 
employment in low- and high-skilled services have to increase less, and the effective 
employment in manufacturing has to fall less in order to meet equilibrium demands. 
This in turn implies less adjustment in employment shares and in  relative  average 
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wages. Increasing the value of the elasticity of substitution takes the model’s pre-
dictions further away from the time paths observed in the data. As can be seen in 
Figure 9 the transition paths look virtually the same for  ε = 0.002 and  ε = 0.02 , 
while for  ε = 0.2 the model predicts less adjustment, but it does reasonably well. 
This latter version of the model predicts 46 percent of the increase in  L and 27 per-
cent of the increase in  H sector average wages relative to  M . In terms of employment 
share changes, the model predicts at least half of the observed changes between 
1960 and 2007.
D. implications for Occupational Employment Polarization
Even though our model is about sectoral labor market allocations, we can use it 
to calculate the fraction of occupational employment share changes that it predicts. 
Fixing the within-sector occupational employment shares at the 1960–2007 period’s 
average, we can compute how much the sectoral labor reallocation—as predicted 
by our model—would explain of the (between-sector) occupational employment 
share changes identified in the shift-share decomposition of Section IC. Our model 
predicts 82 percent of the manual, 72 percent of the routine, and 63 percent of the 
abstract occupation’s between-industry employment share changes. This is equiv-
alent to 44 percent of the total manual, 24 percent of the total routine, and 15 per-
cent of the total abstract employment share change. However, given that our model 
abstracts from occupational differences within sectors, and thus by construction 
cannot explain any of the within-industry changes in occupational employment, we 
think that the model explains a quantitatively important fraction of total occupa-
tional employment share changes.
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Figure 9. Transition under Different Elasticities of Substitution
notes: The graph shows the path of employment shares (panel A) and relative average wages (panel B) for differ-
ent elasticities of substitution, against the data. The thin line shows the data. The solid lines show our baseline cal-
ibration ( ε = 0.002 ), whereas the dotted lines represent the path for  ε = 0.02 , and the dashed lines for  ε = 0.2 .
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IV. Conclusions
The literature on polarization of employment and wages has typically focused on 
occupations. We present a set of new empirical facts that suggest that in addition to 
reallocations between occupations within industries, also shifts between industries 
contribute to the polarization of labor markets. Moreover, we show that in terms 
of broadly defined industries, polarization was present as early as 1950–1960 and 
directly linked to the decline of manufacturing employment. Based on this evidence 
we propose a novel explanation, one based on structural change. A methodological 
contribution of our paper is that we develop a multi-sector model with heterogeneous 
labor in Roy-style fashion, the most parsimonious setup that yet allows heterogene-
ity in wages. An insight from our model is that unbalanced technological progress 
does not only lead to structural change, the reallocation of employment across sec-
tors, but also affects sectoral average wages. We find that higher productivity growth 
in manufacturing than in low- and high-skilled services increases employment and 
wages in both the low-skilled and the high-skilled service sector, thus leading to the 
polarization of the labor market. This simple model does remarkably well in predict-
ing the sectoral wage and employment patterns of the last 50 years.
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